September 14, 2026

National Speleological Society
Board of Governors

The National Speleological Society Board of Governors Manual requires directors to report their board-level activities to the membership each year, expressly so that members can make informed voting decisions (Act 02-948). That obligation reflects a basic premise of the Society's governance: the Board answers to the membership, not the other way around, and the membership cannot exercise that check without transparency it can rely on. Our response below draws on the Society's own Board of Governors Manual and Bylaws, Board meeting minutes and agendas, financial reports and budgets, the Society's Form 990 filings, and recognized nonprofit-governance standards, cited as we go.

POINT 1: WHAT THE BOARD SAID, AND WHY IT MISSES THE POINT
We asked the Board to separate the Executive Director and Secretary-Treasurer jobs and appoint an independent Secretary-Treasurer. One person holds both, and since August 2024 that person has also headed the Accounting & Finance Division, which keeps the Society's books and manages its insurance. The Board's answer addresses only whether combining these jobs is legal, which nobody disputes. The real concern is structural segregation of duties: one person holding all three positions removes the checks and balances that are supposed to exist. "It's allowed" doesn't answer whether it's a good idea. The Society's own Financial Review Committee draws that same line in its own rules, barring any member from holding bank signature power for exactly this reason.

And it's not just us. Oregon's Department of Justice, which oversees charities in that state, puts it plainly: "Effective internal controls limit any single individual from having control over two or more phases of a financial transaction or operation." The National Council of Nonprofits says the same. The BBB Wise Giving Alliance, the country's leading charity-accountability watchdog, goes further: its standards bar the person with financial-oversight responsibility from also holding executive staff authority, and specifically rule out a paid financial officer filling that role. The Bridgespan Group, writing for donors vetting a nonprofit's finances, lists "accounting and finance functions all lie with one person" as one of six financial red flags. None of these sources mention NSS, and none call the current setup illegal. What they show is a recognized, widely shared concern about the structural segregation of finances. Given that NSS assets have grown to about $14.8 million, it’s now critically important to keep financial jobs separate rather than just nice-to-have. This separation is something other boards, auditors, and **donors** expect to already be in place.

Since July 6, 2026, the Secretary-Treasurer holds nearly all of the Society's financial authority: custody of cash, bonding, investment accounts, authority to open and close bank accounts, control over what the Financial Review Committee sees, and the financial report. Bank-account signature authority is separate. It's granted to the Secretary-Treasurer, the Executive Director, and the Executive Director's own designated agents; an arrangement that predates the July 6, 2026 BOG meeting and wasn't part of that change. The same person is also Interim Executive Director, overseeing accounting, spending, personnel, and financial processes, and Division Head of Accounting & Finance, whose division includes the bookkeeper and the insurance function and answers to whoever holds the Executive Director job. The only financial authority they don't hold is the BOD Chair's narrow $10,000 emergency-purchase power, the Financial Review Committee acting as a group, and the outside auditor. The Board's answer treats this as just how things have always worked. It skips the real point: *this is a reversal of a decision the Board made deliberately two years ago during the governance restructuring*. When the Board created the Executive Director position in 2024, it moved nineteen separate rules, covering the Society's cash, bonding, investment accounts, bank accounts, and financial reporting, from the Secretary-Treasurer to the new Executive Director. That wasn't incidental. It was the centerpiece of that restructuring, built at the same time as the Executive Director job.

On July 6, 2026, the Board undid the core of that two-year-old decision in one sitting, almost entirely through a single bundled vote with no individual discussion of any of it. The Board already had a much lighter-weight way to handle a gap in the Executive Director's job. A rule added in October 2024 says that when the Executive Director's seat is empty, the Chair of the Board temporarily takes on that authority until someone new is seated. The Board did not use that option

on July 6. Instead, they permanently moved the Society's core financial powers to the Secretary-Treasurer's office, without explanation.

The Board points to the Chair of the Directorate, the Financial Review Committee, and its expense-approval software as oversight. All three are periodic reviews, someone checking in from time to time. That's different from what prevents one person from controlling money end to end. No single person should be able to initiate a transaction, approve it, execute it, record it, and review it, with no independent party anywhere in that chain. The Chair's own financial power is narrow: a $10,000 emergency-purchase limit and sign-off on small requests. Standard nonprofit financial guidance keeps the person running overall operations separate from the person running financial-reporting controls. *When one person holds both, that separation disappears, and no one inside the organization is watching the books independently of the person who controls them.* The Board may point to these same checks, Chair sign-off, Committee review, the expense software, as compensating for the lack of separation. Compensating controls work only when someone independently reviews the transactions consistently and documents that review. **The Board's response documents no independent, consistent, or documented review of this kind.**

The Financial Review Committee shows the same problem from another angle. Its own charter bars any member from holding bank signature authority, for the same reason we're raising here: watching the money and controlling it are different jobs. Yet a 2024 charter change moved in the opposite direction. It enlarged the Committee's required size from three-to-five members to five-to-eight, at the same time the Committee's own report described struggling to fill even three seats. It replaced the flat bar against any Society officer serving on the Committee with a narrower rule covering only signature authority. And it rewrote several duties to specifically involve the Executive Director and Secretary-Treasurer by name, the very offices this letter concerns.

The Board's response sets the permanent Executive Director search to begin in mid-September, targeting the 2027 Convention. On that timeline, one person holds the financial authority of the NSS, spanning the audit, the police matter, and the search itself, the same period the Board calls the priority for financial controls. None of what follows needs to wait for that search.

What We're Asking the Board to Do:

1. Structurally segregate the three positions currently held by one person: Interim Executive Director, Secretary-Treasurer, and Division Head of Accounting and Finance. Together they span the Society's entire financial lifecycle: spending, custody, and recordkeeping. Separated, each checks the others. Combined, they eliminate every internal check at once. How the Board separates them is its choice.
2. Explain why the Board reversed the 2024 restructuring's allocation of these financial powers in one bundled vote, without the discussion the original 2024 change received. If a deliberately built governance structure can be undone in a single vote with no individual discussion, the Board can just as easily undo whatever separation it adopts now. How carefully this reversal was considered bears directly on how durable any fix the Board commits to will actually be.
3. Confirm the Financial Review Committee's current membership and fully address the substance of the 2024 charter changes.

POINT 2: INDEPENDENCE OF THE INTERNAL REVIEW OF THE REPORTED EMBEZZLEMENT

Board response in Point 2 answers a question we did not ask. Confirming that no current officeholder supervised the terminated employee tells us who oversaw them in the past. It does not tell us who controls the review process and the information feeding it now, while the Mauldin & Jenkins audit is underway. **That is the question this point raised, and it remains unanswered.**

One person now holds the Society's entire financial authority across three positions. The Secretary-Treasurer title, held by that person since 2024, carries the Act 15-509 duty to arrange what the Financial Review Committee sees about the Society's bank accounts and the Act 15-573 authority to open and close them, both of which moved from the Executive Director to that office on July 6, 2026. Act 15-573's signature authority, granted to the Executive Director, the Secretary-Treasurer, and the Executive Director's own designated agents, was untouched by that amendment. Add this Division

Head authority over the division that keeps the books and manages the Society's insurance, and one person controls all three functions, regardless of how or why the July 6 reassignment happened. *Whether this person once supervised the terminated employee is irrelevant. What matters is what they control now, and the Board's response leaves that question untouched.*

We do not dispute who personally supervised the terminated employee. Before August 4, 2025, that employee reported to the Facilities Chair. After that date, supervisory responsibility transferred to the Executive Director's office, and the employee was terminated during that tenure. The Secretary-Treasurer never supervised them, and that was never our concern. The Board response frames the earlier period as falling outside the authority structure this letter addresses, because it predates the Executive Director's own start date. It does not. The same individual has served as Division Head of Accounting and Finance since August 2024, a year before the Executive Director position was filled, and that division's responsibilities include the Society's bookkeeper. The reported loss spans late 2023 through early 2026. For the portion of that period from August 2024 forward, the accounting function that would have recorded or reviewed the transactions at issue already sat under the Division head authority, regardless of who held the Executive Director title or supervised the employee directly. Predating the Executive Director's start date is different from predating every office that matters here.

Our concern is who controlled the process that turned a tip into a finding. By the Board's own account, an initial conversation led to the Secretary-Treasurer notifying the Executive Director; the Executive Director and the Secretary-Treasurer then discussed the matter with the Facilities Chair; the Executive Director assigned their own subordinate to review the books. The Board calls that review comprehensive. We call it what it is: everyone in that chain, before the matter reached the Huntsville Police Department, worked inside or at once beside the Executive Director's own office. No *independent* party touched it at any point.

What we mean by "independent" requires four things, and by the Board's own account, none were present. First, the initial report routes to a body with no stake in the outcome, such as the Financial Review Committee, not to the officers whose own financial authority is in question. Second, that body, not management, decides the review's scope and method, including whether to bring in an outside forensic reviewer before any internal review begins. Third, whoever examines the books has no reporting relationship to the individual with financial authority over the accounts at issue, which rules out an employee the Executive Director supervises directly. Fourth, the decision to refer the matter to law enforcement doesn't wait on a conclusion reached inside that same office first. *The sequence described, an internal conversation, notification up the same chain, an internally assigned reviewer, and only then a referral to the Huntsville Police Department, satisfies none of these.*

The Board's response states: "The on-site bookkeeper (now office manager) has always done, and still does, the accounting for venue rentals and the bookstore. The Secretary Treasurer was not and still is not involved in those operations at all." Act 15-884 says otherwise. It places the NSS Bookkeeper position in the Secretary-Treasurer's own department and requires that Bookkeeper to report to the Secretary-Treasurer. That reporting line has been followed continuously: the position was held as an Agent of the Treasurer through at least 2022, and the current bookkeeper, the same one the Board's response credits with this accounting, has held it since October 2024. Separately, the Secretary-Treasurer has also headed the Accounting and Finance Division, which includes the current bookkeeper, since August 2024. Together, these two facts mean the Board's statement that the Secretary-Treasurer was "not involved… at all" describes neither the office Act 15-884 defines nor the person who currently holds it. The Board needs to reconcile their response with Act 15-884 and with their own officers' reports. Mauldin & Jenkins has the full record and the Financial Review Committee's endorsement. Neither confirms that the engagement's scope includes assessing whether the internal review itself was conducted independently, as distinct from assessing the books and current controls.

The Board's response argues that recusing these officers entirely would cost the audit their institutional knowledge. We agree, and we are not asking if they be excluded from answering the auditor's questions. But that is not what recusal requires. Recusal means not controlling or directing a review of a matter in which one has a personal stake. It does not

mean staying silent. Answering an auditor's questions is one thing; deciding what gets reviewed, by whom, and in what order is another. The Board's response addresses only the first.

We are asking the Board to do the following:

1. Confirm who, other than the Secretary-Treasurer, will control what information the Financial Review Committee and Mauldin & Jenkins receive about this matter.
2. Reconcile the claim that the Secretary-Treasurer was never involved in this accounting with Act 15-884, with the Secretary-Treasurer's own reports, and with the fact that the same officer has headed the Accounting and Finance Division, which has authority over this accounting function, since August 2024
3. Confirm that the Mauldin & Jenkins engagement's scope covers the independence of the internal review, not only the books and current controls.
4. Commit that any future report of this kind routes directly to the Financial Review Committee, which controls the scope and method of review, including whether to engage an independent forensic reviewer, before any internal staff member accesses the records.

POINT 3: SECOND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW OF THE INTERNAL INVESTIGATION

Mauldin & Jenkins was approached in December 2025 after Financial Review Committee vetting, budgeted in March 2026, began work June 1, 2026, and was given all facts related to the loss. That tells us when the engagement started and what it received, not what the firm was asked to determine.

According to the Board, no amount of review of bank accounts, headquarters accounting, or event accounting would have led it to discover the embezzlement, and that these measures have been in place for years. The Secretary-Treasurer's own notes to the financial statements, dated September 30, 2023, say otherwise: "Venue rental deposits are incorrect. They show $30k in refunds paid to renters but none of the deposits from renters have been put in this account. Meaning at least $30k in Rental Income is NOT income." Same account category as the reported embezzlement, flagged in an official report more than two years before discovery, and never investigated. We're not claiming this is the same money later reported as embezzled, only that the existing review process already caught an anomaly in this exact account and nothing was done which is hard to reconcile with "no amount of review would have led to discovery."

This is not an isolated lapse. The Society's own Secretary-Treasurer and finance-division reports document the same pattern recurring every year from at least 2019 through 2025: unreconciled accounts, deleted clearing accounts, discrepancies written off rather than investigated. The same September 2023 notes call the books "pretty far out of whack" and describe "writing off accounts and balances that are inaccurate" as routine practice. A June 2024 report told the Board only one account remained unreconciled, while its own itemized detail listed several more. In 2025, reconciling the investment accounts for the first time since 2019 surfaced an unexplained $158,000 surplus that remains unresolved. Under Appendix J, III.C of the BOG manual, each of these reports was considered received by the Board on presentation. Six years of self-reported, Board-noticed reconciliation failures is the operating environment the Board's response calls adequate.

The Board called increased in-office oversight, with the Secretary-Treasurer at headquarters weekly, “the greatest mechanism for preventing future issues,” and identify in-office management as the key issue to resolve. That same officer is also the Interim Executive Director and the Division Head of Accounting and Finance. Naming this officer's presence as the primary safeguard puts the fix in the hands of the same person whose combined roles are the subject of our first two letters. One person's presence is not structural control. Are there no other oversight measures that do not depend on any single person?

Board response cites Bylaw V.A.3 to say the Board will act on what the audit or law enforcement produces, not on its own. Bylaw V.A.3 says the Board is responsible for oversight of the Society's operational components. It says nothing about limiting that oversight to ratifying other bodies' findings. A bylaw assigning oversight to the Board is a basis for the Board to examine this directly, using records already in its possession, including the 2023 notes quoted above.

We welcome the Board’s commitment to share the Mauldin & Jenkins report, findings, and recommendations with the membership in full, along with any resulting Bylaws changes. We also ask the Board to share the engagement scope too, not only the final report, so members can confirm the audit was assigned to answer the independence question before its findings are presented as having done so. Repeating that the audit is underway answers none of the questions brought up here.

We are asking the Board to do the following:

1. Confirm Secretary-Treasurer's in-office presence is not being treated as a substitute for structural segregation of duties and describe what specific oversight measures exist that do not depend on any single officer.
2. Provide the scope language directing Mauldin & Jenkins to assess the independence of the internal investigation, not only to assess the financial statements and current controls.
3. Commit the audit specifically examines the September 2023 venue-rental discrepancy and the broader reconciliation-failure pattern documented in the Board’s own officers' reports since at least 2019 and discloses the results.
4. Confirm whether the Board reads Bylaw V.A.3 as limiting its authority to what the audit and law enforcement produce, or as the source of its own authority to act.

POINT 4: FORENSIC ENGAGEMENT SCOPE AND TIMING

The Board's response to Point 4 declines a forensic engagement now and leaves that decision to a recommendation from Mauldin & Jenkins. We are not asking the Board to duplicate the audit or to interfere with the Huntsville Police Department's investigation. We are asking what the current audit is directed to evaluate.

The Board describes the Mauldin & Jenkins engagement as a complete audit, not the minimum Act 15-510 review, undertaken for reasons that predate this matter. That explains why the engagement exists, not what it's directed to evaluate. A financial-statement audit under Act 15-510 tests internal controls and account balances on a sample basis, checking a representative subset of transactions rather than all of them, against a materiality threshold that sets aside discrepancies too small to affect the financial statements as a whole. The Board's own account of the loss describes something different: an embezzlement conducted "almost entirely by handshake and cash deals that have no records and leave us with little to no evidence." A scheme built on small, undocumented cash transactions is likely to fall below that threshold and escape a sample-based test by design. Investigation of the embezzlement requires a forensic accounting engagement, which examines specific transactions in full rather than by sample, regardless of the engagement's scope.

The Board states it gave Mauldin & Jenkins all information related to the loss and asked to identify relevant findings, and that the Board will act on a forensic recommendation if the firm makes one. That places the decision in the hands of a firm whose engagement, by the Board's own description, wasn't built for this purpose. A firm conducting a standard audit doesn't always flag the need for a different kind of engagement unless specifically asked to consider that question.

The Board raises cost duplication and interference with the Huntsville Police Department's investigation as reasons to wait. Forensic accounting engagements commonly run before or alongside active law-enforcement investigations, not after them; investigators and forensic examiners routinely rely on each other's work rather than compete for the same evidence.

The current plan leaves a forensic engagement contingent on Mauldin & Jenkins recommendation, with no date for that recommendation or for reconsidering it. Evidence relevant to a cash-based scheme, memory, informal records, access logs, degrades further each month. If the Society carries fidelity or crime coverage for employee theft, that process may also require an independent loss determination separate from the general audit. Though the Board commits to sharing findings with the membership to the extent law enforcement permits, that qualifier is undefined.

We are asking the Board the following:

1. Confirm whether Mauldin & Jenkins was engaged and instructed to apply forensic procedures to this specific loss, not only to assess the Society's financial statements and current controls generally.
2. Confirm whether the Board has discussed the timing of a forensic engagement directly with the Huntsville Police Department, and whether the department, rather than the Board's own assumption, is the source of any concern about interference.
3. Commit to a specific point, at minimum the receipt of the Mauldin & Jenkins report, at which the Board will revisit whether forensic procedures are warranted.
4. Confirm who determines what law enforcement permits the Society to disclose to its membership, and how that boundary will be confirmed rather than simply asserted.

Point 5: Minutes Finalization

The availability of minutes has been an ongoing issue. It was even a point of discussion at the 2026 Congress of Grottos at the NSS Convention. Board response to Point 5 accepts that the Appendix J.V.A finalization cycle has not been met but gives no date to clear the backlog. That cycle requires the draft to reach Board members within 14 days after a Board meeting, the corrected draft to be posted to the NSS Business page within 30 days, and the Board-approved final version to replace it after the Board's next regular meeting. Most of the minutes posted after 2024 are titled as DRAFT. The June 29, 2026 minutes are themselves proof of why draft minutes cannot substitute for final ones. Within that single meeting, the motion to rescind the March 14, 2026 museum funding was amended from the floor to change its own description of the underlying action, from a "motion" to a "directive," before the final vote. If wording can change substantively within a meeting's own record, before that draft is even reviewed and finalized under Appendix J's correction process, members reading a draft have no assurance the words they're reading will match what the Board ultimately adopts as official.

The Board states that final minutes through May 27, 2026 have been shared with the Bylaws committee; draft minutes from June 29, 2026 and July 6-10, 2026 meeting are posted on the Events page of caves.org. Sharing minutes with a committee is not posting them for the membership, which Appendix J.V.A requires, and draft minutes over 60 days old are already outside the 30-day rule your response cites as the standard the Board has fallen behind on. The 9/14/2026 Special Meeting agenda confirms the backlog has grown rather than cleared: it lists the June 29, 2026 and July 6, 2026 minutes as still awaiting Board approval, ten to eleven weeks after those meetings and well past the point Appendix J.V.A contemplates a final version replacing the draft.

Our review of the NSS website, current as of September 13, 2026, confirms this and adds a further gap: no minutes are posted under Business Documents for the March 14, 2026 and May 27, 2026 board meetings. The July 6-10 minutes record the Board approving the May 27 minutes, yet no agenda or minutes for the May 27, 2026 meeting ever appeared on the NSS Documents page.

The Board suggestion that we contact the Bylaws committee to help see the updated BOG Manual sooner misplaces the responsibility. Compliance with the Board's own Manual is the Board's institutional obligation, not a task that depends on members volunteering labor to accelerate it. Treat the backlog timeline above as a Board commitment, not a task for members to help expedite.

On contents, Board response answers a broader question than the one we raised. We asked that finalized minutes include, regardless of personnel sensitivity, the motions considered and their disposition, attendance, and any conflict-of-interest disclosure and its resolution, as Act 05-121 requires, and that movers, seconders, and vote counts continue to appear, consistent with past practice, without disclosing confidential personnel deliberations.

Act 05-121's attendance and conflict-of-interest requirements are answered: Board response confirms both will be included. On motions, Board response reads "motions" and "disposals of motions" narrowly enough to exclude movers, seconders, and named vote counts. That reading isn't supported by the Society's own practice: the 2023 Board minutes in our files record a named mover, a named seconder, a roll-call vote by name, and the result, existing practice, not an expansion beyond the Act.

Closed sessions under Act 03-363 are followed by a report to the membership with as much detail as can be given without jeopardizing the Society, a policy your response calls reasonable and we don't dispute. One specific case: the Board voted in closed session on June 29, 2026 to terminate the Executive Director's contract. Our review found the June 29, 2026 minutes on the NSS Events page, not the NSS Business Documents page.

We are asking the Board the following:

1. State a specific date by which the current minutes backlog will be cleared, and confirm that the Appendix J.V.A cycle, the draft reaching Board members within 14 days after a Board meeting, the corrected draft posted to the NSS Business page within 30 days, and the Board-approved final version replacing it after the next regular meeting, will be met going forward, not only addressed as a one-time catch-up.
2. Explain why the March 14, 2026 and May 27, 2026 minutes remain unposted. The July 6-10, 2026 minutes record the Board approving the May 27 minutes, yet neither meeting's minutes appear anywhere on the NSS website. State when each will be posted and confirm that future Board minutes will be posted under Business Documents rather than Events.
3. Confirm that finalized minutes will continue to include movers, seconders, and named vote counts for motions, consistent with the Society's own past practice, and not only a bare notice of each motion's outcome.

ADDITIONAL POINTS: INTERIM COMPENSATION, FUND-WITHDRAWAL AUTHORITY, BONDING, CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY, VOLUNTEER BACKGROUND CHECKS, AND REVIEW OF GOVERNING DOCUMENTS INTERIM COMPENSATION.

Recusal from a vote on one's own pay is the right outcome under Act 03-445, and Bylaw VI.A.5 correctly places that authority with the Board. We take the Board account of the July 10, 2026 closed session at face value, but note that the minutes documenting it are posted only on the NSS Events page, not under Business Documents, the same misfiling pattern our Point 5 letter already raises. *Confirm when these minutes will be moved to Business Documents where members can find them and confirm whether this disclosure was also provided to the Financial Review Committee, which Appendix AV separately charges with monitoring the Society's conflict-of-interest policy.*

Fund Withdrawal Authority: Act 15-573 does grant signature authority to the Executive Director, the Secretary-Treasurer, and the Executive Director's own designated agents, as your response states. That Act does not name the Chair of the Board anywhere. *Confirm whether routing distributions previously approved by the Executive Director to the Chair of the Board is a formally adopted Act or Bylaw provision or an informal practice layered on top of Act 15-573, and confirm that the post-audit codification review you describe will formalize that routing itself, not only a numeric withdrawal threshold.*

Bonding. The Board response says that Act 15-020 makes the Executive Director responsible for bonding Society employees and members, and that the Interim Executive Director is not an exception. That is not what the Act currently says. The same July 6, 2026 omnibus motion already before you in our other letters amended Act 15-020 to read: "The Secretary-Treasurer is responsible for bonding Society employees and members, including NSS National Convention Treasurers, who have access to significant Society funds on a regular basis," striking "Executive Director" and inserting "Secretary-Treasurer." *Correct your response to reflect the Act as the Board amended it, and confirm that bonding responsibility currently sits with the Secretary-Treasurer's office.*

Conflict of interest policy. Act 03-445 and Appendix BR are as your response describes. The former Executive Director's draft policy has apparently sat unvetted and unadopted since before this year's events, and your response now defers a vote until the Fall 2026 meeting in Boise, to be taken up together with the audit's recommendations. *Confirm what interim safeguards apply between now and that meeting, and confirm a specific date the vetted policy will be circulated to the membership ahead of the vote.*

Volunteer background checks. Completing checks for all employees through ADP is a reasonable baseline. Your response says the Board believes certain volunteer positions, such as JSS coordinators, should also be checked, without

committing to a process or timeline for identifying which roles those are. *Confirm who determines which volunteer positions require a background check and by when that determination will be made.*

Review of governing documents. Bylaw VII.E.4 does charge the Bylaws Committee with keeping the Bylaws current, and Appendix AV does charge the Financial Review Committee, working with the Bylaws Committee, with proposing modifications to finance-related Acts. Your response does not say how the Board will resolve a disagreement between those two committees once the audit's recommendations are routed to both. *Confirm that resolution process and confirm it will be disclosed to the membership.*

The questions in this letter are not an attempt to relitigate settled matters. They ask the Board to do what Act 02-948 already asks of every director: give the membership what it needs to make informed judgments about its own governance. We ask the Board to respond to each point above with specific dates, named processes, and direct answers, not general assurances that current practice is allowed. The membership's ability to hold the Board accountable depends on it.

With respect and appreciation for the NSS Board of Governor’s service,

On behalf of the concerned members of the National Speleological Society

Concerned NSS Members